Introduction

The most suitable if one wants to proceed [is to begin] analytically from common knowledge to settling what its supreme principle is, and then synthetically from examining this principle and its sources back to common knowledge to which it applies. Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, 1785.
Misology as a methodology aims not only to answer what an individual, or a group of people said about a given concept, but also what is unsaid or said incorrectly, and why it is so. Thus, it does not narrowly mean to resent sound reasoning, and rather implies mistaken, incomplete, problematic, or unprofessional reasoning. For instance, rational choice theories tell us what a rational actor (A) would do in a given case, say to alley with B to alienate C in an election. But, in reality, these actors may not always act rationally, as anticipated by our theories. Why do they not? What is missing in their calculation that lead them to act "irrationally"? Or what is missing in our calculation that lead us to misunderstand rationality? The case becomes much more complicated when it is applied to a concept. For example, why do a group of people think about liberty in a way they do? What is missing in their interpretation of liberty? Misology asks a nonexistent void, rather an existing vacuum to which my mind could not plug me in. I was neither terrified nor pleased. I was unconscious-i was not an I yet-but, i was. Gradually, i retreated to my shell, to my not-yet self. As unconsciousness encountering beings, i grew into consciousness. i encountered the ungraspable non-i and the inceptive i-naked and disarmed, trembling from exposure to the vacuum. I had no coherent mind but ephemeral deliriums. My heart was lacerated by loneliness. It was real, since I began to feel it, yet the feeling was conditioned in hallucination. My veins were swollen with fear, and my bones were cracked by gravity. My flesh began to grow as though it was chewed by leprosy. i had ears, but heard things that only later on reminded me of the cacophony of the jungle's beasts and the ocean's leviathans. i heard the cracking sound of my own tortured inner voices growing like a dandelion rooting in frozen cement. i for the first time felt my inner self-but muffled by the indifferent world around me. i was paralyzed, unable to talk, or even to die. As I was sweating in pain, the opium of nonknowing was fading away; i was walking out of my shell to myself.
There, the growling of beasts could sound mellifluous and the guise of monsters could look gorgeous. i heard and saw, though it was only hiss-like sounds and hellish visions. As these things-fear, loneliness, pain, sounds, and appearances-happened to me, so i turned to an I. I came into being by deconstructing the world in order for me to construct the world of mine.
As the world was being changed for me, i was changed to I. These changes brought together my mind and the world of mine-knowing and being. 37 This is not a fairytale, and is rather a phenomenological story of how consciousness comes into being, something like Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in a concise, literary style. Several points to which references will be made later on abide within the story. 38 Most importantly, it indicates that there is no separation between my mind and the constructed world of mine.
They are inseparably fused together. My mind tightly overlaps with the world in a fashion that my world is my knowledge of the world of mine. There is no gap between me and my mind, a separation between them is due to lazy linguistic and imaginative habits. Using an analogy of seeing is elucidating. In Latin, the term for "to see" ("animadverto") basically means "to turn the mind to," and in Greek, "the perfect 'I have seen' is the present 'I know.'" 41 As soon as we say "I see that thing," we separate the "I" and "the thing" and tend to overlook that the act of observation resides neither in the observer nor in the observed object. Rather, it is the relation between them. Observation is the act of observing, and is not chopped to the two poles of the observer and the observed object. It is a property of neither the observer nor the observed object, but observer-observed fusion. Likewise, knowledge is the act of knowing.
There is only one process of knowing taking place between mind and the world assumingly chopped to the two pieces. It is unity-in-duality, or mind-world fusion, or monism.
If one imagines that mind and the world are two drifting entities between which there is a gap (i.e., dualism), she or he would run into an epistemic impasse, which eventually necessitates leaning towards monism. One might tend to argue that monism is refutable because when, for instance, a researcher studies a phenomenon, the person situates himself within or above a new condition (i.e., a case study), and by doing so bridges the gap between his mind and the new world (i.e., condition). The situated researcher is either (i) inside or (ii) outside of the new condition, from where his mind grows. This growth is supposed to indicate that there is a gap or dualism between mind and the world crossed by learners.
(I) Insider epistemic location is a solipsist claim in the sense that it asserts that truly to condition is supposed to entail that he is detached from his naturalized, personal, conceptual world, and therefore could start over afresh within a new world.
On the contrary to this claim, there is no way for one to separate his mind from his world, and then sink it in the new situation, because such a separation means evacuating one's mind from any conceptual understandings of the world. That would be a total break from the world and a regression to the hideous state of not knowing akin to the beginning story. The claim of insider epistemic location is not easy to digest because of its mystical nature; that is, the researcher is required to chop history (the world) and his flow of life (mind) into time-space slices, and then decidedly starts over from wherever he wishes as though life were a video game.
The case of the Oveysi School of Sufism could clarify my point. The schoolmaster, Nader
Angha, states that in order to understand a text, a reader must experience the recorded phenomenon as though he or she is the author. If the text is divine (e.g., the Bible, the Quran, etc.), the reader should be God. To understand what, say, a piece of rock is, one should be attuned to it, that is, to experience life as if he is not only a piece of rock, but that piece of rock. "This can be done," according to Angha, "by revitalizing our senses, aligning our brain with our heart, and 'tuning into' the same energetic wavelength." 43 Angha states that "you cannot know anything that is outside of you, because to know something in its totality requires that you be that entity." 44 However, since we can revitalize our senses, according to Angha, we could be and therefore know a myriad of things from God to rock.
Knowing, therefore, is annihilation of object and subject into each other, and it is possible only if one has access to the insider epistemic location in which the insider-researcher could adjust his frequency of life with other entities, and subsequently commit an ontological leap from physical to metaphysical realm (man  God), as well as animate to inanimate life (man  rock). One problem is that scholars like Angha take it for granted that differences (e.g., between one and others, God, rock, etc.) stop us from knowing. In order to know, we should be identical, and epistemically homogeneous with a given person or object, in the case of Angha's teachings. On the contrary, as Sartre put it plainly, "the reality of that cup is that it is there and that it is not me;" 45 and exactly this dissimilarity between us (that I am not that cup) makes us known to us. I am because I am bound to be me, and not that cup. The boundless thing that is identical with everything (e.g., me = rock = cup = God, etc.) is identity-less and therefore nothing. All-being is nothingness. Boundlessness is nihilism. "A man actualizes himself," Hegel states, "only in becoming something definite." 46 One might assume that since the insider thesis advocates situatedness in a given context, it actually endorses finitude. It is incorrect because in order for one to be an insider, first he should erase his mind, and then become situated. An "erased" mind rather connotes potential infinitude. If God once said "let there be light, and there was light," today the "revitalized" man undecidedly and naively says "let there be God, or this rock, or that cup, or an Iranian intelligentsia, and there he is God, rock, cup, and an Iranian intelligentsia." Insider-researcher claims infinity.
The problem is not only that one should understand others as an insider, but should be able making," an interpretivist political scientist, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, points out, "is due to an ontological and epistemological presuppositions," rather than a reductionist approach to human nature. More precisely, "assumptions about human nature are ontological assumptions.
So, in that sense, interpretivists assume that human's meaning-making capacity is central to studying human beings." 49 In a softer tone: we make meanings. In a stronger tone: we cannot avoid making meanings. As soon as I said this, I turned my head and saw a fruit knife on my computer desk. I am seeing it without interpreting it: it is a fruit knife, nothing more or less.
Yet, the fact that I said "it is a fruit knife" demonstrates that I am interpreting my observation through the prior concepts of fruit and knife, as well as being and time (it is). That man is walking. It seems like a non-interpreted description. Again, I am filtering the occurrence of that man and his walking through concepts of man and walking, and a set of countless interrelated concepts in the background. Even in the most succinct and judgment-free statements, as soon as knowledge is used, interpretation sneaks in.
The interpretations and expressions, however, do not mirror the world. They are ours, and people from different epistemic locations or communities have different understandings of the same phenomenon. By reflecting on an occurrence, different people deflect it differently.
Moreover, by being engaged with an occurrence, the interpreter and the interpreted mutually affect each other. We affect the occurrence by deflecting it through our interpretation and expression, and the occurrence affects us by going through us: "our life is animated through the world [...] It is as though we are a lightening rod through which electricity flows, filtering and conveying our existence." 50 We change by being gone through.
Another aspect of the meaning-making is the concept of estrangement (i.e., a rift and disconnection from within the self and the outside social and natural worlds). Meaning-making and estrangement repel each other. For Hegel, estrangement was fought by ethical life, which is a social sphere wherein a people with a shared custom communicatively make sense of their life. Hegel thought a modern person could play two roles: being a self-interested private individual, and a community-interested public agent. When these two (being for myself and and without knowledge, we descend to the state of being that was depicted in the beginning story.) In the final conclusion (synthesis), regardless of how hard one tries to be neutral, there always remain elements of the initial understanding (thesis) from which the final result is reached. Outsider epistemology claims to be neutral. Additionally, as Haskell puts it appositely, although it is feasible to shift our epistemic location and re-evaluate our belief from various locations-objectivity and not neutrality-we have social and political commitments, which do not allow us to be neutral (i.e., being purely objective and above the context, so to speak).
The outsider claimer, similar to the insider claimer, thinks he can erase his mind. In fact, he thinks that he erases his mind, and it remains erased until the research ends. Their noepistemic-location thesis is a claim of infinity. It thinks it has no location and is above every location. Unlike the insider-researcher, who humbly wanted to be something and therefore knew either this or that, the outsider-researcher without trying to be anything assumes knowing this and that-God, and this rock, and that cup, the Iranian intelligentsia, etc. In total, outsider epistemic location, neutrality, and the claim of dualism as their philosophical basis are philosophically and socially unattainable. The lack of engagement and being above a context causes conceptual (unconsciousness) and sociological (estrangement) problems. The idea of transcending a context and possessing knowledge from an outsider epistemic location makes a resemblance to the "dead-play" technique by which, even though an actor acts as though he
is not a part of the play, he is actually acting and influencing the overall performance. The outsider epistemic location is a theatrical approach to knowledge.
In the end, the rejection of the insider or outsider claims does not refute the possibility of knowing. If insider and outsider positions are not realistic, and knowing is yet possible, from where does one need to begin to know?
Simplest Category
In simplest component of the economic system, and therefore is the beginning point.
Two points should be made clear: first, if one does not begin from commodity, and starts from, say, capital, he or she has to make references to commodity, while explaining capital.
So, although commodity is not the necessary beginning point (i.e., one must begin from commodity, otherwise the final result will be worthless), beginning from commodity is the most efficient way of presenting and organizing the argument. 58 Second, commodity is not as easy to grasp as the term simplest would suggest. Indeed, the opening chapter of Capital where commodity is explained is the most intricate part of this magnum opus. The term simplest neither means easy to grasp, nor basic.
It is incorrect to assume that commodity is basic in the sense that it is the economic system's "real 'cell,'" 59 so to speak. A confusion of "basic" with "cell" may happen since Marx himself used the term cell as a metaphor. For instance, he said "the single commodity appears as the elements.
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In summary, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cell (e.g., advocated by Ilyenkov) and the simplest category argument (e.g., proposed by Ehrbar). The former is unsupportable (i.e., at least, it is not misological) due to its individualist methodology. Although the latter correctly points out that commodity is the beginning point since it is the simplest category, it stops short. It considers commodity to be the beginning point because it is the "simplest social ). This requires clarification.
Lay-hypothesis
After pinpointing the concept from which presentation begins, the researcher asks, "What do people think about this concept?" That is, the research begins from a lay-hypothesis, or people's belief (e.g., of commodity, rather than commodity in itself), and not what the researcher thinks. Lay-hypothesis, or more generally lay-knowledge, is similar to the term laywitness. A witness gives testimony about a crime in court, although he is not a criminologist.
Regardless of his lack of expertise, the witness's words are taken seriously by the jury and detectors, since his or her words are the leads, following which the truth could be found by If we do not make meaning of the world as we do, which may be incorrect for various reasons, the social life would not be as it is. One is constrained to believe in the power of these meanings because of their real historical consequences, even though they might not be a consequence of real history, as Thomas Theorem so aptly puts it. One needs to take the belief of people (that collecting more commodities means having more wealth) seriously because the system runs by the force of this belief, although it may be just an illusion created by the fetishism of consciousness and the fetish-like character of commodity.
For instance, in some places, Marx goes as far as knowingly beginning with an assumption that is "in fact, not the case": "I proceed from the assumption that it [value of labor power] is really paid at its full value, which is in fact not the case." 69 He clearly does not begin from the point that he think is the correct theory or belief: he says "capital is the economic power that dominates everything in bourgeois society. It must form both the point of departure and the conclusion and it has to be expounded before landed property," 70 but then he begins the discussion with commodity.
In the first statement in Capital (vol. I), Marx uses the term "present," and immediately in the second statement says: "the single commodity appears as the elementary from of wealth." It means commodity appears to be wealth, but there is something deeper, behind the appearance.
It is important to know how Marx uses certain terms, such as "presents," "seems," "represents," and "appears." When he uses these words, he means to signify various things.
(i) It is simply wrong to reify the system by thinking X does Q or is Y, even though X seems to be Q or do Y. (ii) If X appears to do Q or be Y, it is not only because people reify; rather, the system makes X seem/appear so. (iii) We do not have enough knowledge at the moment to conclude whether X does Q or is Y. (iv) Sometimes Marx uses "seems" and "appears" because he does not want to change his direction and elaborate on X. 71 Marx intends to state that the capitalist societal structure makes people reify social complexity, and this is why commodity is simply viewed as the source of wealth. However, there must be something 
The unsophisticated heart takes the simple line of adhering with trustful conviction to what is publicly accepted as true and then building on this firm foundation its conduct and its set position in life […] If they had been serious with what is universally accepted instead of busying themselves with the vanity and particularity of opinions and things, they would have clung to what is substantively right, namely
Emergence
The idea of emergence presupposes a multilayer world, in which phenomena emerge at the empirical realm from deeper layers. In other words, not everything is at the surface; there ought to be something else underneath the surface. For instance, critical realists argue that the world is not one-layered; rather, it consists of three layers of (i) empirical or sense impression,
(ii) actual, wherein events happen and therefore make sense impression possible, and (iii) real, that is underlying mechanisms that give rise to the events. Positivists recognize only the first two layers. In the case of Hegel and Marx, there is an institutional core from which phenomena emerge at the empirical surface. Taking a closer look at Hegel's Philosophy of Right helps to understand this point better.
The Philosophy of Right is divided into three spheres: "Abstract Right" (in which individuals are legal actors) "Morality" (wherein individuals listen to their moral dictums), and "Ethical Life,"
itself divided into three subspheres of family, civil society, and state, or political community.
Each sphere is indispensable, and at the same time, each should be transcended due to its incompleteness. The sphere of "Abstract Right" positively affirms the inviolable legality of individuals based on being the bearer of certain rights; yet, it is insufficient because it does not exhaust the humanness of individuals, since in this sphere "the subjects are involved only by 76 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 4.
a minimal part of their personality." 77 The laws designate individuals' rights and obligations, but cannot distinguish individuals' personalities. They are indifferent to the differences between individuals. Within the sphere of "Morality," individuals step back, so to speak, and turn inside, that is, "the relationship of the subject with himself." 78 Here one is more reflective; nevertheless, it is not sufficient because an actor oriented purely on the basis of a moral standpoint is "disoriented and 'empty' so long as he does not resort to certain normative guidelines drawn from the institutionalized practices of his environment." 79 He or she needs some social arrangements and consensuses like culture in order to be able to distinguish good from evil. This one-sided moral standpoint pushes the argument towards the "Ethical Life," transition which is of critical importance, theoretically and methodologically.
Regarding this transition to the sphere of Ethical Life, Axel Honneth offers a thoughtprovoking line of argument. By employing Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy as "therapy,"
Honneth argues that Hegel saw "social sufferings" due to a "conceptual confusion" that "held us captive." The conceptual confusion, which is similar to the reified lay-knowledge, is the "foundation of practical attitudes in life […] shared by social actors" rather than "just a wrong statement." 80 At this point, it seems that Hegel deepens his lens, so to speak, to find the remedy for suffering, such as "solitude," "vacuity," "burden," or, generally put, "suffering from indeterminacy" 81 in the institution of Ethical Life. The transition to the Ethical Life is where Hegel makes his shift to the core of the society from which suffering emerges, and wherein the remedy for suffering can be found.
The case of Marx is more sophisticated and straightforward. The economic institution of capitalism is the core from which class struggle and all the maladies of the working class come to the surface. In addition, to these historical phenomena there is a nonhistorical parallel world, which is not ahistorical. If something has not been actualized, a phenomenon that has not happened yet, it does not mean that it is not real. If I cannot, for instance, sell my commodity in the market, it does not mean that it does not entail exchange-value, and therefore is not a commodity at all. "A railway on which no one travels, which is therefore not consumed, is potentially but not actually a railway." 82 Since the act (e.g., the purchase, unused road, etc.) has not been actualized yet, it is nonhistorical, but not ahistorical (nonreal). It is waiting in a parallel world to come into being in the phenomenal world. It is real but not actualized, and therefore not empirical. This is the depth of Marx's multidimensional ontology.
It is clear that there is a core, which is socio-economic institution for Marx and ethical life for Hegel. After spotting the core institutions, the task of a researcher is to find institutional (logical) explanations for empirical (historical) phenomena. The logical explanations maintain that they know the reasons behind the historical occurrences. 83 For example, because of its particular historical context, X necessarily happened as it did. As Hegel so unforgettably said
"what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" and the task of philosophy is to understand
what it is. 84 That is to say, Hegel thinks that since something exists (what is = historical), it is not only real, but also ought to be rational, and our task is to explain its necessarily logical emergence.
Marx's position bears similarities and differences to that of Hegel. Consider the following example: Marx says, "according to Rodbertus [a German scholar] use-value is 'logical' thus, since man must also breathe, 'breathing' is a 'logical' concept, but not a 'physiological' one at all. The entire shallowness of Rodbertus, however, emerges in his contrast between 'logical' and 'historical' concepts." 85 It seems that although Marx is not as compromising as Hegel (i.e., enthusiastic to accept that since something exists, it ought to be rational), he considers no contrast between historical and logical. What he objects to is to make use of a concept (e.g., exchange-value) in an historically incorrect condition (e.g., feudalism exists, it is because its emergence is possible here and now under capitalism, and not there and then, say, under feudalism. B occurred because A prepared the conditions for its occurrence.
Since a given phenomenon happened (B), there ought to be a logical explanation for it (A).
The historical question (i.e., the occurrence) and the logical question (i.e., the reason behind it) complete each other.
What Marx and Hegel do is similar in the sense that they attempt to find institutional explanations for what is happening historically. Lay-knowledge is a historical phenomenon that should be understood in light of the current conditions. Marx and Hegel discovered layknowledge (e.g., the equation of wealth to accumulation of commodity and freedom to ability to do things) and institutions under which it is formulated (i.e., capitalism and ethical life). The next step is to understand how the institutions create lay-knowledge. Marx particularly and meticulously examined this issue under the topic of fetishism (i.e., the fetishism of consciousness and the fetish-like character of commodity), which later on became better known and expanded under the rubric of reification.
Reification
Reification is the key to a well-rounded research. According to the Oxford Dictionary, to reify means to "make (something abstract) more concrete or real." 86 Woodard adds that "the first syllable of the word (Latin res, thing) is the same root as the first syllable of the word 'real'; and to re-ify is therefore to take as real that which is only apparently real." 87 He further suggests seven definitions for reification: (i) a conceptual matter taken as a perceptual thing (e.g., reducing power to muscularity); (ii) a relational matter taken as absolute and independent (e.g., considering someone to be a brother, which is meaningful only if the person has a sibling, regardless of whether or not he has any siblings); (iii) a nonexistent phenomenon given physical reality (e.g., visualizing God, angels, and demons in perceptible forms); (iv) a subjective matter given independent, objective reality (e.g., following a mirage in the desert as though it were real water); (v) a local phenomenon taken as universal (i.e., stretching the reality of something too far to the extent that it is viewed as a universal fact, such as considering morals to be universal, regardless of local differences); (vi) losing sight of the "relativity of proof and the debatability of belief" (e.g., taking mysticism for granted); and (vii) an extension of something's reality by excluding other things (e.g., excluding the merits of a given religion by rejecting the merits of its rival religions). 88 Some of the definitions are clearly similar. There is something that they all share-"an unjustifiable extension of reality of the conceptual to perceptual object." 89 Reification is fabrication of a thing-like character for something that is not a thing. Unlike Woodard, Hanna Arendt argues that reification is not only justifiable, but also necessary.
In order [action, speech, and thought] to become worldly things, that is, deed and facts and events and patterns of thoughts or ideas, they must first be seen, heard, and remembered and then transformed, reified as it were, into things-into sayings of poetry, the written pages or the printed book, into paintings or sculpture, into all sorts of records, documents, and monuments. 90 Reification, for Arendt, is a type of materialization without which action, speech, and thought evaporate and "lose their reality at the end of each process and disappear as though they never had been." 91 Reification is, at its core, fabrication.
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The actual work of fabrication is performed under the guidance of a model in accordance with which the object is constructed. This model can be an image beheld by the eye of the mind or a blueprint in which the image has already found a tentative materialization through work. In either case, what guides the work of fabrication is outside the fabricator and precedes the actual work. 93 Note that, in this sense (i.e., the translation of an idea into reality), reification is quite often and constructive. A similar thesis was made by Karl Marx. At one occasion, in Capital (vol. I), he says A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labor process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the beginning, hence already existed notionally.
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We first envision a thing and then call it into reality. So, reification means to transfigure something abstract and conceptual into a concrete and perceptual thing. Karl Marx is the first social scientist that systematically examined this concept, although he did not use the term reification, and instead employed two interrelated concepts: the fetishism of consciousness and the fetish-like character of commodity. The statement that "the wealth of those societies, in which the capitalist mode of production reigns, presents itself as an 'immense heap of commodities'" is reificatory since it indicates that people give a thing-like character to wealth.
This can be rephrased as "people reify wealth (an abstract concept) into the form of commodity (a physical object)." Marx's description of reification is stated in the following quote from Capital (vol. I):
What is mysterious about the commodity form is therefore simply that the social characteristics of men's own labor are reflected back to them as objective characteristics inherent in the products of their labor, as quasi-physical properties of these things, and that therefore also the social relation of the producers to the aggregate labor is reflected as a social relation of objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. Through this quid pro quo, the products of labor become commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time extrasensory or social. Under capitalism, social relations and people's labor are taken as something absolute, objective, and independent. The reification of labor into the form of a commodity conceals the fact that commodity is not just a thing with physical characteristics, and rather contains subjective, actual human labor. 96 It hides from sight that wealth is not a thing but social relations. In other words, the tangible object conceals (i.e., fools us not to observe, or distracts us from remembering) some of the properties of the reified concept. It creates a blind spot, so to speak. But, how does it do that?
It does so by the power that we give to things. For instance, we make religions, but then our manmade gods stand between us and regulate our behavior, as if they are not our creators and we are unquestionably dependent on them. Likewise, in society, we fail to understand that commodities are the manifestation of our labor; that is our forgetfulness provides commodity with a god-like power that rules over our conduct. Under capitalism, (the production of) commodities regulate our lives. But, why do we let things master us? Our failure to see through commodity, like forgetting that gods are our creations, sneakily siphons off our power to them. Marx calls this the false consciousness of "fetishism." 97 This cognitive error, however, is not the real cause. Rather, it is itself institutionally created by the fetish-like character of commodity.
On the one hand, during the process of production, the labor embedded in commodity is subjective, specified, and concrete. On the other hand, during the process of circulation in the market labor is viewed as something universal and unspecified, objectively measured based on time. That is, labor is essentially the labor of a certain person, spent in a certain way; yet, it is treated and traded as something general, universally measured by time. So, labor is heterogeneous and concrete in production, but homogenous and abstract in circulation. This gives commodity, in which labor is embedded, a dual character. Commodity is really the congealment of concrete labor, yet is perceived as though it is abstract labor. The formation 96 Note that it does not mean that people are stupid because they think having more commodities brings more wealth. They are actually right at the empirical level. The problem is that they are too pragmatic, forgetful, and short-sighted, and therefore stop short and do not see through more fundamental issues at play, such as social relations of production and labor power congealed in commodities. 97 Lukács. However, they then propose that reification is a phenomenon of consciousness, and not social institutions. "Reification is modality of consciousness," and therefore "the possibility of reification is never far away." 102 That is to say, it is a cognitive matter that may happen under any condition (e.g., tribalism, feudalism, or capitalism), and therefore is not a problem specific problem of our age. This conclusion is further supported in psychological studies. Woodard, for instance, argues that reification is caused by habituation, naiveté, and indoctrination, which are phenomena of consciousness. Berger, Luckmann, and Woodard suggest that reification is a cognitive issue. The latter misses a simple point that Marx tried to make-even if reification is a cognitive matter, how reification takes place is conditioned by where one lives (i.e., social institutions).
In order to clarify the role of contextuality and situatedness in causing reification, I shall employ an example from applied linguistics. Language is an institution with certain grammatical roles and words. In English, in order to form the past tense, one should add -ed to the end of the majority of regular verbs, for example, walk-ed, concern-ed, etc. As a result, a great number of verbs in the past tense form end in -ed. In addition, there are numerous nouns that end in -ed, such as greed, reed, heed, seed, etc. That both nouns and verbs may end in -ed can cause ambiguity for non-native English speakers and, as such, they may rely more on lexical items that indicate the past (for instance, yesterday, last semester, previous summer, etc.) than verbs ending in -ed. Therefore, it is easier and more economical for nonnative English speakers to judge the temporality of a given sentence with words like "yesterday" than past-tense verb morphology (i.e., -ed). In this sense, when a non-native speaker reads English, he or she habitually learns to recognize "yesterday" as a more reliable indicator of the past than -ed. This example shows that it is the institution of language that leads to the formation of a cognitive map that looks for more obvious indicators, that is, lexical items that indicate the past more than verbs ending in -ed. This is analogous to Marx's theory and his emphasis on institutions, unlike other sociologists and psychologists.
Like an applied linguist, who discovers the cognitive maps shaped by a given language, a researcher's objective is to understand the mental pattern projected in the mind of people under certain institutions. In other words, first, it is acknowledged that reification is a byproduct of the social institutions; and second, in order to understand people's reificatory misconceptions, which perpetuate the existing condition of life, a researcher should not only understand the context (i.e., institutions) and the text (i.e., people's lay-knowledge) but also discover the cognitive priori that is caused by the former in the minds of the latter.
Conclusion
By using Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Marx's Capital (vol. I), this chapter attempts to put forth an alternative to positivist methodology. It refutes the possibility of ontological dualism, as well as insider/outsider epistemic locations, and then questions from where a research should begin, according to misological methodology. Unlike positivism, it is argued that the simplest category, as understood by people (lay-hypothesis), is the beginning point. This beginning point is evidently different from deductive positivism. That is, there is no need for projecting formal hypotheses nor, as a result, testing them; instead, people's reifying lay-knowledge of a given concept should be taken as the starting point. Then, the lay-knowledge should be explained in light of the institutions. Lastly, and most importantly, after knowing the layknowledge and examining the institutions from which it emerges, researchers attempt to link
